Five Faces of Progress: The Road to Anti-Progress |Prof. Tyson Retz Pt.2 | Ep. 4

E4 - Transcript from Riverside
Marshall (00:00)
Let's move on to relative progress. When you go through this, I also just
want to point out before you go that some of the histories and the stories
that you told in this particular chapter of the book were to me, especially
about the Japanese, the first time that I've ever come across some of these
perspectives, which I thought were absolutely spectacular.
Maybe now, just kind of with that in mind as an aside, could you kind of talk
about the conception of relative progress and then maybe touch a little bit
about the importance of the Japanese and the Indian perspective as well?
Tyson Retz (00:32)
Yeah, so the point of that chapter under the category of relative progress is
to bring in the point that I think becomes more and more prominent in
thinkers minds in the late 19th century. That is the relativity of the idea of
progress and put some meat on the bones of the idea of relativity is to say
that it's an evaluative concept. It's one that requires evaluation. And R.G.
Collingwood, the philosopher of history and practicing archaeologist, has a
nice, very short chapter where he defines progress as gain without
corresponding loss. And historically, I think that is a way of thinking that
becomes prominent, or at least features in writings about the idea of
progress from sort of the mid-19th century, but certainly once you start to
see larger political movements of social reform in the new liberalism of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. This idea that, yes, there is
progress, but at what cost and for whom. And those classical questions of
distribution become questions that need to be answered. My focus in that
chapter is to bring in, is to challenge the absolute idea of progress with
groups who think about
⁓ collective advancement. So I talk about a number of marginalized states
that have been subject to colonialism. I talk about the Aboriginal
Improvement Association in Australia, Marcus Garvey in the United States,
the Japanese and how inspired they were by
Oh, I'm sorry, the African-American associations led by Garvey and how
impressed they were by Japan's performance in this defeat of Russia in
1905. It was a kind of, I didn't put it this way in the book, but there seemed
to be a kind of global network of progress societies forming very much
under the idea that
I suppose what's difficult about relative progress is that it only makes sense
if you take absolute progress as the yardstick. I think analytically, the hard
part in that chapter is to say, well, yes, there's an increase in realization that
progress for some is decline for others, or that progress in one domain
might lead to degeneration or decline in another domain. But that...
you're still having to articulate all that along some linear concept of catching
up is the word we use here, backwardness as well. This idea of back in
Eastern Europe, backwardness is a word that, you know, check.
Marshall (03:26)
Mm.
Tyson Retz (03:33)
Hungarian scholars are using themselves. It's not ones that those from the
West have come in and are labeling these societies backwards. It's one
that they're using themselves to note the fact that they feel like they're
lagging behind in time, that there's a temporal catching up that needs to be
done. And that, relatively speaking, they are behind in some way.
And that animates their social movements. So this chapter is about social
movements and political movements that are about catching up on the
scale of universal progress. So it's tricky. It's a tricky thing to do. But I think
it captures a nice moment in political history, especially which
Marshall (04:11)
Thanks.
Tyson Retz (04:18)
which later is reacted against once we see the rise of...
new form of liberalism, neoliberalism, in the interwar period. But that period
from, say, 1880 through to 1930s is hugely rich when it comes to smaller
groups rallying together to bring about progress in their own terms,
because they know well and good that progress is not a natural law
motoring society forwards. It's only, well, you mentioned Sorel before, in
some sense, it's a decadent bourgeois philosophy of complacency, is that if
progress is a natural law, well, I can just sit back and let it happen. I don't
really need to do anything, do I? So it doesn't lend itself to political action
and to purposeful action or collective decision-making by virtue of the fact
that it's out there in nature doing its work ⁓ automatically.
Marshall (05:09)
And on the note of Sorel, without going too far into him, very much many of
his ideas were regarded as theory of action, which fits right into the
framework that you provide. I just want to go back to the Japanese for one
second, because like I said, I was really struck when I was, and my
interpretation of your writing here, Professor, it was almost as if you were
saying that the Japanese saw progress in a very pragmatic way, almost
progress as a tool.
Tyson Retz (05:17)
Volunteerism.
Marshall (05:38)
and that they were not so, I think you stated explicitly that moral progress
was not necessarily their venture, that they were really interested, progress
is a form of survival and progress is a tool for embeddiment of society and
they had a specific way that they went about it, which inspired some of
those other people. Would that be an accurate reading of your work,
Professor, because that's how I read it I thought it was, to me, it was very,
very
Yeah, and on the note that you mentioned regarding groups that were
inspired or movements that were inspired, I actually pulled a quote from
your book, which I thought really laid this out quite well. You were quoting
Booker T. Washington and saying that, wonderful progress of the Japanese
and their sudden rise to the position of one of the greatest nations in the
world has nowhere been studied with greater interest or enthusiasm than
by the Negroes of America. And then I thought that that made that point.
quite clear, actually. And again, to me, that's the first time that I ever saw
the Japanese in that light, to understand that other people saw them in that
light
And this movement that we talked about, would it be fair to say, and I kind
of gleaned this from your book as well, that this was an attempt at
decoupling progress from history in a way, separating the ideas a little bit
and not tying it necessarily to this path. You mentioned movements in
China, for example, that were interested in the future and not looking back
at history. So this notion of, like I said, decoupling progress from history,
would that be a fair assertion to say that this is one of the outgrowths of this
particular time?
Tyson Retz (07:09)
I think China enters the book on two different levels. I mentioned Dewey's
tour of China and how influential that was for bringing the scientific method
to China and it sort of being kind of a methodology for what liberals
connected to.
Fourth of May movement, considered to be desirable, the kind of reforms
that were being sought after in China in the first half of the 20th century. But
also China is also important for introducing the concept of iconoclasm and
the complete destruction of the past in order to create the future that you
want.
which is another concept of progress, but it's a concept of progress that
reconfigures that connection between past, present, and future quite
drastically when most concepts of progress are kind of some incremental or
modification of something in the past into the present leading into the
future, iconoclasm or...
this destruction of the past in order to start anew and create the future you
want is something truly different. India, you mentioned briefly too, I think
India was interesting in the sense there that you have a revivalist
traditionalism. I mean, it was known long before the British left that they
would leave one day and there was already thought regarding the kind of...
the kind of future that the Indian people wanted after the departure of the
British. And certainly there were traditions that were indigenous to India
itself that could be revived and brought to the fore. Nehru was interesting
because he shifted from being a Marxist to a liberal later on, but he thought
that
Indian traditions could breathe new life into liberalism. That's a fascinating
topic of discussion as well, I think. This sort of blending of tradition with
something from outside that is the European, or sort of liberalism as it
arose in Europe and the United States.
17th, 18th, 19th centuries and then blending with something indigenous to
completely different culture. And that being what enables it to live on and
become what it could be as well in Nehru. ⁓
Marshall (09:39)
And to sum up this particular categorization, and like you said,
categorization slash periodization, I understand, this led to this next
conceptualization of progress, this notion of everybody's progress. And just
before you explain that, if we could just close, would you say that there was
this redress of the past, if you will?
Was there something about that particular impulse that led us to the next?
You can explain everybody's progress, but also was that a response in a
way to this relative conception of progress?
Tyson Retz (10:16)
Absolutely. In some ways I think everybody's progress is conceptually the
most interesting because it's a full-fledged reaction against what Hayek
calls historicism.
He uses the word, he uses historicism idiosyncratically. He actually uses it
in a way that's quite the opposite to how historians think of historicism. But
historicism to him is this idea that he connects with Hegel and this
speculative armchair philosophizing that thinks it has.
felt or ascertained the direction of history before doing any real historical
research. So it's a form of history that supposes to know the direction in
which history is progressing. Now that might sound like a purely conceptual
gripe, but to Hayek it has disastrous political consequences because it...
It legitimizes authoritarianisms and totalitarianisms of all sorts because if a
leader can claim to know the direction in which history is progressing, well,
it validates almost any action to achieve that ultimate end. So it lends itself
to despotism because the ultimate end is known.
That is the direction, that is the ultimate purpose of history, and all our
actions should therefore be directed towards that ultimate goal. And if
you're an obstacle to that, well, there's good reason to dispense with you.
to him, historicism, as he understands it, as an a priori speculation about
the direction of history, is politically very, very dangerous.
progress to him and the thinkers that he assembles around him in the Mont
Pelerin Society from 1947 and what later becomes known as neoliberalism,
that much overused term neoliberalism, is, you know, it's an interwar
reaction against, you know, earlier forms of collectivism.
Marshall (12:12)
Mm.
Tyson Retz (12:20)
that you saw with the New Deal in the United States and the new liberalism
of the late and early 20th centuries in Britain and that ideology of social
reform and the rollout of the welfare state and all the things that free
marketeers don't like with the big state and everything else. That is put in
question with Hayek and these late and neo-liberals, progress to them.
is completely decoupled from history. That's what you get out before. It's
completely disconnected from history because Hayek has this great line, I
think, where he says guided progress would not be progress. So progress
is that which occurs through the spontaneous, non-historical order, which
he gets from biology. mean, Hayek, interestingly,
evolutionary biology is hugely important in his thinking. And he sees history
as something that has no real role in politics, and politics moreover being
something that, or human action being something that spontaneously
occurs. Now to Karl Popper, ⁓ yeah, this, this, this,
Marshall (13:28)
I'm just going to go next to that, yeah.
Tyson Retz (13:32)
This is not a crazy idea, but he's not quite so radical, I'd say, to Popper. We
should also be suspicious, or highly not just suspicious, but we should
reject historicism fully. The poverty of historicism is about this,
idiosyncratically defining historicism in the manner of Hegel as direction of
history.
And he thinks that that progress is the result of individual problem solving.
So politics should concern itself solely to the problem at hand, and we
should attempt to solve that problem as best we can. Now, I think
Collinwood's idea here about gain without corresponding loss would matter
here. You want to solve a problem and limit the amount of consequent
problems as much as possible. And as an evaluative concept, you can see
here how progress becomes quite difficult to achieve because even the
most seemingly benign solution to a problem could have a range of
unintended consequences that might be considered something other than a
gain, might be a loss even environmental degradation or any number of
things.
Marshall (14:52)
And you mentioned also in the chapter as well as you kind of allude to it
now this notion of a free market, yet at the same time there seems, I was
trying to understand what looked like a contradiction in their thinking during
this time about this idea of the role of statistics and control or rationalization
of a process down. And I think this was ⁓ something that you had
mentioned regarding. I think the exact quote was, statistics were comforting
in an age perceived to be defined by an accelerating and disorienting
inter-determinancy. So I think that's an interesting tension too.
Understanding this idea of a free market, let things fly and at the same
time, they seem to be within this neoliberal plan, as you mentioned, a sort
of like a built-in system of control as well.
I got a hyper rational approach. Would that be a fair statement, Professor?
Tyson Retz (15:44)
Absolutely, if I didn't write it I definitely read it somewhere that a
deregulated market requires regulation in order to keep it deregulated. No
regulation is a form of regulation too, so the neoliberate free market is one
that's highly regulated to remain free.
Marshall (16:04)
And that is really a phenomenal quote to kind of a point on that particular
aspect in that particular category. Before we move into the last, ⁓ I want to
be conscious of your time. Do we have another 15, 20 minutes, Professor?
Or are you rushing out? know you... Please.
Tyson Retz (16:18)
No, let's keep going. Yeah, there's one more thing. I I think it's
worth saying something about with relative progress. You mentioned
statistics. In the word statistics is the word state. And they are a way for
states to create a narrative of progress. So there's a kind of narrative, a
kind of employment here, the way that numbers are implotted.
in a narrative to bring about, well, I wouldn't say the illusion, but that's
putting it cynically, but to argue for progress or to create belief in the idea of
progress. And I think this is a huge feature of the second half of the 20th
century. Absolutely, you know, of the trois glorieuses, the three decades
of... massive ⁓ economic growth and affluence from the end of the Second
World War to the mid-70s. If this is, I think this is a major component of
20th century history. This use of statistics to create a kind of narrative
structure.
of progress when states are collecting statistics that provide you with the
kind of hard data that you need to know that your life is getting better.
Marshall (17:31)
And this really was incredibly, again, incredibly helpful. And it also bolstered
your point about this idea, you know, when we were talking earlier about
the role of scale and you mentioned, well, scale is just yet one factor of how
we can kind of like impose our perspective on it for a point of history and
how we essentially become an agent in defining what progress is in this
context, which I thought was really poignant and really, really well stated.
And now I think this brings us to the kind of like the summit and I would say,
and I think you implied now, I know this book was written a few years ago,
but it seemed incredibly current to me now, this notion of anti-progress. So
professor, if you would kind of just talk about what anti-progress means in
this context and what it was a response to, and then I wanna talk about
some of its features.
Tyson Retz (18:21)
Yeah, I think the important point to make with this category and chapter is
to go back to the book and the purpose of the book in the first place. It is a
book in a series for those interested in historical theory and practice.
A lot of the readers of my book I envisage as a student studying history and
needing guidance on movements in the way history is being thought of and
practiced. And certainly in the past 20 years, one of the major turns in the
theory of history and historical practice more generally is this expansion of
scale. So we see.
It's like big history, which is very big in US schools. That has a lot of money
behind it to study history, according to the recent history of nation states or
even as far back as antiquity, but that history from the Big Bang up until
now. Obviously,
That's big. Then we talk about deep history, is a way of tapping into
Aboriginal pasts and very big, my home country of Australia. Deep history
is a way of telling stories about that land that substantially predate the
arrival of Europeans. The Anthropocene is something that conceives of the
planet in
quite different ways. It blurs the distinction between the human and natural
sciences that have given, you know, sort of influenced the way we work in
the humanities for a long time. So this expansion of scale is a massive
feature of the way we think about history over the past 20 years and it
certainly places less emphasis on the traditional historical or political agent,
that is the individually or collectively acting human agent of classical
historiography from the mid-19th century to very recent times. So my
purpose in that chapter is to consider the implications, or mainly the
political implications, of blurring out the purposefully acting individual if
we're conceiving of history so largely, I mean this is, for instance, deep
history and big history make the universal history of the Enlightenment look
minuscule. I mean this is something far larger.
Marshall (20:37)
The increase of the depth as well as the width, then you start to lose, again,
the implications being, as you mentioned in one of them, obscures the role
of human agency here and points to something else, which is a little, to be
frank, little unclear of what this then implies about the kind of the prime
movers behind.
history, it's a little unclear. In other words, if we're replacing a
conceptualization of human agency, what is replacing this? To me, it was
difficult to kind of get my head around that.
Tyson Retz (21:12)
Yeah,
Well, I mean, a lot of recent historical writing will talk about other kinds of
agency. You'll talk about the agency of objects, that is, non-human actors
having a kind of agency. And this is certainly increasingly a feature of the
way historians think.
Vico, I think, is important to mention here, going back to the early 18th
century, in that he provides a philosophical foundation for history to emerge
as the study of purposeful human action. And that model being the one
that's being downgraded, I suppose, in recent times. mean, Dipash
Chakrabarti makes this very interesting argument that
that humans have become kind of unintentional agents, in that maybe the
history of unintended consequences should be more over-focused than
what human beings intended. Then outside of historical thought per se,
have scholars such as Peter Haff, who talks about the technosphere, which
is an idea that, well, to put it..bluntly is that we don't control technology. It
controls us, and it has its own agency that's quite separate from what we
intended to do with it. If you want to talk about AI, think that would be the
way to go there. That takes half ideas somewhere quite radical. That our
intentions of what we were trying to achieve with this technology.
really don't matter in the greatest scheme of things because it becomes
something so much larger than
Marshall (22:51)
And on that point, and again, I really love the whole Peter Haaf
technosphere, you know, framing of this because then, you know, to kind of
like bring this forward, as you mentioned, AI without going too deep into the
specifics, but more along the ideas of create the notion of creating a
technology that we really don't understand. And I think that there are other
instances in history, even going back to the 70s, I remember when they
were talking about creating chemicals that cleaned up oil spills and people
were frantic about this notion about that this was gonna become
uncontrollable and we would start depleting the world's resources. Again,
that's a bit of an irrational example, but it just shows this idea of creating
something that we can't possibly control.
And I think that there's even more kind of philosophical, and if you come
and professor, I'd appreciate it, more philosophical grounding to this,
coming back to the Germans, the 19th century German philosophers, about
this idea of the role of technology and how technology could potentially
create a series of unintended consequences.
And I think that this is, again, which is so wonderful about reading your
book, you can on your own start to draw these through lines to go back and
see some of these relationships. And just to kind of now circle back to the
present, you again, you mentioned this whole idea of the, you know, the
Peter Hoffs idea of the technosphere.
it's a little unclear again, like reading kind of like going back to his work as
well as your interpretation of it to understand, so is this saying that some
other force, some other mover is controlling this technology? In other
words, is it just a question of random results that we don't understand? Or
is it a result of that there's other actors here?
that we don't quite understand. I mean, I really feel that that's an important
philosophical point that I would love your response for is this, you, when
you came up with the idea for the naming of this particular category,
anti-progress, what's the implication there? What is the meaning of
anti-progress in this context? What are you actually saying?
Tyson Retz (24:59)
Yes, I suppose it would be interesting. Probably the best way to answer that
is to compare it with the very first category, and that is no progress,
because there might seem to be similarities, but they're quite different. In
the first chapter where I talk about no progress, I'm talking about
there being a deficiency in the conceptual resources for conceiving of the
idea of progress in the first place. That is, they didn't have a philosophy of
history that was amenable to belief in the idea of progress. What I mean by
anti-progress is something quite different. That is to say, it is a recognition
that
Progress as it has been conceived over the past two or three hundred
years is something that May have one on the first place led us somewhere
ultimately undesirable and therefore it's not something I subscribe to This is
people think I'm not speaking from the first person, but those who take that
perspective or secondly
Marshall (25:56)
Yeah, yeah.
Tyson Retz (26:00)
that there are agencies at work, and I think you put that very nicely in your
description just earlier about Huff and AI, that there are agencies at work
that are playing a more influential role in shaping the future than my own
individual action or even collective action. So it's a skepticism about the...
the effect, the overall impact of that purposeful human action.
Marshall (26:28)
And to again, just kind of briefly go back, because you mentioned Vico with
a fantastic reference in the book as well, and Sorel. Interestingly enough,
seemed like there was also a component in their work that implied, well,
regardless of what one might think of who the prime mover is, and this was
kind of one of Sorel's points, was the idea that
the psychological aspect is in a realm that it's just unknowable for us. It's
too complex and we can't, so it's not even a question of like assigning the
agent, but I think this is where the AI relationship really comes into play. It's
a question of creating things that you don't understand that are too complex
for you to understand. So there may be no implication of a prime mover or
some kind of a divine force, but yet humans have this capacity to create
things that they can't control. And as you put so well, Professor, this notion
of unintended consequences. And when I read your chapter again about
anti-progress, and thank you for that clarification, because that's super
helpful, it also kind of brought back this idea of there's an implied
pessimism there too, that we have this potential thing among, and I'd like
you to comment on this please, is there a force among us with this that's
run amok? And then I also want to talk to some folks with a slightly different
perspective on that. But please, Professor, if you would comment first.
Tyson Retz (27:48)
Yeah, definitely. think anti-progress is definitely engaging with a widespread
cultural pessimism in general. I don't think I have to do much Googling to
get survey numbers on how people are responding to the question of
whether they think their country is on the right track. think it's pretty
devastating, both in the US and Europe. The way young people especially
are conceiving of their future certainly pessimism seems to be in vogue
And but but it's not just the pessimists and the anti Not going to say
anti-progressives because a lot of these folks would still consider
themselves progressive but I started off with that that paradox those who
Do not subscribe to the idea of progress who? whose pessimism regarding
the future precludes that possibility that they're not the only protagonists in
this chapter. I also engage with the eco-modernists and the
techno-optimists who hold on to that more optimistic view that we have the
resources through continuing technological advancement to address some
of these problems that we're faced with in the 21st century.
Marshall (28:58)
And I'm not, literally, you read my mind, that's exactly where I was going to
next, because when I read that, and I've done some of my own work, which
again, was for me, actually part of the incentive of doing this podcast and
this research to begin with, was this idea of trying to understand the quote
unquote, what I perceive as you, Professor, this zeitgeist of anti progress. I
mean, in my own categorization of it was it seemed like the idea of
progress was regressing. And there's an irony there, the idea in and of
itself. But going back to this notion of this optimism, it reminded me as I
was, again, why I love the way that you lay this out. The periodization is
really helpful because it puts things in a context that was easy to
understand. It reminded me again of the absolute progress thinkers. This
seemed like that there was a revival without mentioning it of this. In other
words, we understand and we can control it. A ⁓ hyper elevation of human
agency is how I read that. I love your response to that is if that's what you
think of that categorization.
Tyson Retz (30:06)
Yeah, in some respects, but a conceptual historian argues that there's a
layering process going on. So to say that we, to say that anti-progress is a
feature of the contemporary world is not to say that relative progress and
everybody's progress and absolute progress are still not concepts featuring
in how we understand the concept of progress more broadly. It's all there.
And that's why increasing complexity enters into these concepts to the
point where sometimes we don't know what we're talking about and we
need to be conceptual historians and go back and unravel all these
different meanings. But I think the point on which absolute progress is
absolutely present in this ⁓ neoclassical arguments about the
techno-optimism is this lack of domain specificity once again. It's kind of the
Condorcet part of scientific advancement being tantamount to moral and
human advancement per se, is that the existential crises that that many
perceive that we face today and over the course of our children,
grandchildren's lifetimes are fundamentally existential and technological
fixes will solve or alleviate or lessen the blow of those broader existential
concerns regarding ourselves and the planet we live on.
So there's definitely the absolute progress there in that blending of the
different domains. And I suppose, too, where we talked earlier about the
celebration of technique and of scientific advancement, that on its own.
I call developmental improvement, but when that becomes blurred with the
idea of human progress more generally, then you have the birth of the idea
of progress in the 18th century. And that's certainly still here when you
engage with the arguments of eco-modernists, techno-optimists who see ⁓
larger moral, ethical, existential problems being potentially resolved through
technological advancement. That there is something that really harks back
to that initial moment in the history of the idea of progress.
Marshall (32:19)
Absolutely, Professor, it was a really fantastic point that you made too. And
also, if I can just take you back further in your exploration, it also speaks to
this kind of Promethean promise. I covered that on a previous show, but
again, very much inspired by many of the things in your book. This idea of
going back to Aeschylus' Promethean bound, this idea that progress, while
we may see techne,
As you mentioned, the materialism, the results of the scientific
improvements.
It says nothing about our ability to understand them in a moral, an
improvement of the human soul and understanding that tension. And I
think, you know, by bringing, starting out, this periodization again was really
helpful, right? Because I feel that you could take this idea and put it directly
back into that frame for those who are arguing against whether or not we
can control. And the hubris that some perceive as this optimism. And lastly,
Professor, just on this note, before we kind of close, I want to talk about
kind of like your thoughts moving forward. You know, there was an
interesting articl by Sorel, going back to Sorel that I read, and he had a
very, I thought, a very, just an interesting view on this notion of pessimism
versus optimism. And he felt that his concern, he felt that he didn't want the
burden of being a pessimist, and it's how it was understood, but he felt that
the optimists were really, you know, potentially the ones that would lead us
down these paths of danger, and this was his concern - that there would be
a lack of, that there would be a hubris and a lack of humility regarding the
control and that this optimism would lead to this kind of, again, going back
to this absolute progress, this illusion of control. And I think, again, back to
Sorel, he actually called one of his critical works the illusion of progress.
And this was part of his argument.
Tyson Retz (34:09)
Yeah, I think for him, sometimes you see Sorel was referred to as a
voluntarist Marxist, which is to say you have to voluntarily create the
conditions for a better world. You have to keep on working to improve the
structure in which we live. And that is something that requires constant
work on the part of human beings and subscription to the idea of progress
too easily leads to complacency and the idea that it's someone else's. It's
happening anyway that I don't necessarily need to be an agent in the
making of better conditions for human beings to socially coexist.
Marshall (34:46)
And again, back to this idea of a dialectical conflict, if you will, because he's
basically making the argument that this action is fueled by pessimism.
That's his argument, that the optimist becomes this complacent and
non-humility actor who believes that they can control the future moving
forward.
Well, Professor, this has really been absolutely incredible. And I would love
to if we could just kind of close up, because I think that in, you know, in the
kind of the end of your book, in the epilogue and throughout the book, but
generally, you kind of bring focus to it. Would you say that there is kind of a
new characterization of progress and your thoughts about this? I mean, you
talked about this idea of, you know,the role of human action and a direct
quote that I saw that you made something saying that requires constant
repair, human centered, not cosmic force or natural law. And so maybe if
we can just kind of close out, if you could talk about, do you see a new kind
of conception of progress emerging or is this more like your own personal,
yeah, we can talk there in just a little bit before we go.
Tyson Retz (35:58)
No, I think it's important to remember the original philosophy of history, I
suppose, that was behind the rise of progress as an important concept or a
central concept of European modernity. And that is the idea that collectively
we can decide on what we think is the desirable future that we want. It
tends to be the province of democracy and democratic institutions. They
tend to be the venues in which we...we collectively deliberate on what is
desirable for our future, and that we can, through ⁓ purposeful action, not
necessarily in a straight line, in a linear fashion, but we certainly can act
towards the fulfillment of those objectives. Now, very careful to say ends or
objectives because I'm not here talking about some ultimate loss. There is
no ultimate endpoint towards which these actions are leading. That's
constantly in revision. And I suppose that's a dialectical concept of
progress.
Marshall (37:05)
So it's back to this organ, back to the beginning of our conversation, this
idea of a noun versus a verb, and again, the centrality of human
intervention or human action, which again, I felt was a really inspiring way
when I read the book to kind of like think about all those ideas that you laid
out. It brings us back to this notion, and I think it's a very...
It was very helpful and actually very optimistic for me in reading your work.
I thank you very much for your participation here and I hope at another time
you'd be willing to come back on and maybe drill into some of the other
topics that we didn't talk about or discuss some of your other work that we
didn't get a chance to talk about today as it relates to the idea of progress
and the notions of progress.
Tyson Retz (37:52)
It's been a pleasure. Thank you for the invitation and all the best with the
podcast. I realize you're quite early in its production now. Certainly, we'd be
happy to come back later in the series. So thank you for the conversation.
Excellent questions.
Marshall (38:06)
Thanks again