June 29, 2026

Aristotle, Telos, and the Good Life: What Human Flourishing Actually Means pt. 1

Apple Podcasts podcast player iconSpotify podcast player iconYouTube podcast player iconAmazon Music podcast player iconRSS Feed podcast player icon
Apple Podcasts podcast player iconSpotify podcast player iconYouTube podcast player iconAmazon Music podcast player iconRSS Feed podcast player icon

In the last three episodes, Matt Ehret argued that the history of progress is a contest between two competing visions of civilization: one that develops its internal capacities, and one that manages and depletes them. At the center of that argument was a framework introduced in Episode 11 — the open system and the closed system. That framework raised a question we deliberately set aside: what exactly is being opened or closed? What is the standard by which we judge whether a civilization is developing or declining?

Aristotle has an answer. And it begins with a question most modern philosophy has stopped asking: what is a human being for?

This episode works through three ideas. First: how Aristotle understands the relationship between activity and the good. Second: what he means by telos — the end or purpose internal to a form of life — and why it is grounded in nature rather than assigned from outside. Third: a challenge posed by Karl Popper that Part 2 must answer — whether any fixed account of human ends is compatible with an open society.

Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s reading in After Virtue and Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness, the episode traces what telos means, why it is grounded in nature, and why a critical distinction — between how we come to know things and what we fundamentally are — is essential before the argument can proceed. A key editorial note: Aristotle holds that the intellect begins without innate content (the tabula rasa of the De Anima). But that is a claim about how we come to know things — not a claim about what we are. MacIntyre’s entire defense of Aristotle turns on keeping those two levels separate.

The episode closes with Popper’s charge: that Aristotle’s account of fixed ends generates the intellectual architecture of the closed society. That charge is not answered here. It is posed as the question Part 2 must address.

Show Notes & Timestamps

• Open vs Closed Systems — 0:00

• Telos and Flourishing — 1:26

• Three Key Terms — 1:57

• Every Action Aims at a Good — 4:08

• MacIntyre on Virtue — 4:59

• Eudaimonia and the Virtues — 6:42

• Suspicion of Fixed Ends — 8:28

• Foot’s Natural Goodness — 9:38

• Tabula Rasa Clarified — 11:21

• Popper’s Closed Society Critique — 13:54

• Can Telos Stay Open? — 17:23

• Wrap Up and Part 2 Preview — 18:39

Key Concepts & Terms

Telos (TEL-os)

From the Greek, meaning end or purpose. According to MacIntyre’s reading of Aristotle, the telos of a thing is the end that is internal to its form of life — what it means for a thing of that kind to be functioning well. A telos is not a goal you choose. It is what you are oriented toward by virtue of what you are.

Eudaimonia (yoo-die-MOH-nee-ah)

Often translated as happiness, but more precisely: flourishing. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the full realization of what human beings are capable of. MacIntyre argues that the virtues — courage, justice, temperance, practical wisdom — are not merely instrumental to eudaimonia but partly constitutive of it. Eudaimonia is a form of life you inhabit, not a feeling to be produced.

Phronesis (froh-NEE-sis)

Practical wisdom — the capacity to judge well in particular situations. Named and seeded in this episode; developed in depth in Part 2 and in the upcoming episode with Professor Atif Ansar, where it will do real analytical work.

Tabula rasa (TAB-yoo-lah RAH-sah)

Blank slate. Aristotle holds in the De Anima that the intellect begins without innate content. This episode draws a critical distinction: tabula rasa describes how we come to know things, not what we are. A blank slate in terms of knowledge is entirely compatible with a determinate natural form.

Fascinating Historical Insights

Aristotle’s opening move

Aristotle opens the Nicomachean Ethics not with a principle or a commandment but with an observation: every activity, every inquiry, every pursuit aims at some good. MacIntyre frames this as the foundational move of the Aristotelian tradition. Where Enlightenment moral philosophy begins from rules — what should I do, and why should I obey? — Aristotle begins from character: what kind of person should I become, and what does it mean for a human being to be living well?

MacIntyre’s diagnostic

MacIntyre argues in After Virtue that the shift from virtue to rule-following is the defining mark of what went wrong in modern ethics. Rules without a prior account of what human beings are for cannot carry the moral weight we ask of them. The virtues — on his reading of Aristotle — are not just means to a separate end. They are partly constitutive of what living well actually is.

Foot’s wolf

Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness begins with a simple example: a wolf that cannot run is, in a perfectly straightforward sense, a bad wolf — not because we disapprove of it, but because it is failing to be what a wolf characteristically is and does. Foot extends this logic to human beings, grounding the evaluation in the natural form of life of the species. No theological premises required. No medieval framework. The claim that a living thing can fail to flourish is, on her account, a kind of factual claim.

Popper’s structural charge

Karl Popper’s argument in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) is not that Aristotle had authoritarian intentions. It is structural. Popper identifies three ideas he traces from Aristotle through Hegel: that we can only know a thing’s inner nature through its historical development; that development reveals a destiny present from the beginning; and that the drive to realize one’s essential nature becomes the fundamental category of political life. Together, on Popper’s reading, these generate the intellectual architecture of the closed society — a form of political authority that insulates itself from criticism by appealing to what history requires.

Resources & Further ReadingPrimary Sources

• Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge University Press, 2000. The accessible reading copy used throughout this episode. Crisp’s translation is widely recommended for listeners new to Aristotle.

• Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. University of Chicago Press, 2011. The working scholarly reference. Bartlett and Collins hold closer to the Greek and supply detailed interpretive notes.

Works Discussed

• MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd ed. University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. MacIntyre’s reading of Aristotle provides the central interpretive frame for this episode and Part 2. The Prologue and Chapters 1, 4, 5, 9, and 12 are the most directly relevant.

• Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press, 2001. Foot’s argument that evaluations of living things are grounded in natural facts — without theological premises — gives Aristotle’s telos a contemporary philosophical foundation.

• Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2. Princeton University Press, 1971. Chapter 11 (“The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism”) contains the charge this episode poses and Part 2 must answer.

Further Context

The Aristotle episodes draw on two translation traditions for different purposes. The Crisp translation (Cambridge) is the accessible reading copy; the Bartlett and Collins translation (Chicago) is the scholarly reference, with a Straussian interpretive lineage that will become relevant as the series advances into the Academy Arc. Bekker numbers — the standard citation system for Aristotle — are used throughout and are edition-independent.

Related Episodes

• Episodes 11–13 — Interview with Matt Ehret (Parts 1–3): The open/closed systems framework established across these episodes is the direct intellectual bridge into E14. Aristotle’s telos is introduced here as the standard by which open and closed can be measured.

• Episode 7 — Plato vs. the Sophists: Rhetoric, Power, and Callicles: The most immediate precursor to the Academy Arc. Callicles’ argument that nature vindicates the strong is the counter-position Plato’s Academy was built to answer — and which Aristotle inherits and transforms.

• Episode 6 — Plato vs. the Sophists: The Allegory of the Cave: Plato’s argument that knowledge cannot be socially accumulated — only recollected — is the backdrop against which Aristotle’s very different account of learning and natural form becomes significant.

Coming Up Next

Episode 15 — Aristotle, Part 2 — publishes Monday, July 13.

Part 2 takes up the question Part 1 leaves open: can a fixed account of human ends be compatible with an open society? MacIntyre’s defense of Aristotle against Popper moves to the center, and phronesis — practical wisdom, the capacity to judge well in particular situations — gets the full treatment it was held back from here. The question the series keeps returning to is whether progress requires a prior account of what we are progressing toward. Aristotle thinks it does.

Listen & Subscribe

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/notions-of-progress/id1837506445

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5WgTlVMBfFzrIQwqkqhiD9

Website: https://www.notionsofprogress.com

Substack: https://notionsofprogress.substack.com

Instagram: @notionsofprogress

✉️ Email: marshall@notionsofprogress.com

YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@NotionsofProgress

--:-- - Open vs Closed Systems

--:-- - Telos and Flourishing

--:-- - Three Key Terms

--:-- - Every Action Aims at a Good

--:-- - MacIntyre on Virtue

--:-- - Eudaimonia and the Virtues

--:-- - Suspicion of Fixed Ends

--:-- - Foot's Natural Goodness

--:-- - Tabula Rasa Clarified

--:-- - Popper's Closed Society Critique

--:-- - Can Telos Stay Open?

--:-- - Wrap Up and Part 2 Preview

1
00:00:00,150 --> 00:00:04,290
Aristotle's philosophical framework,
specifically his ideas about essence

2
00:00:04,340 --> 00:00:09,840
and his account of change moving
towards a fixed end, telos, generates

3
00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:13,139
the intellectual architecture
of the closed society, whether

4
00:00:13,169 --> 00:00:15,129
Aristotle intended this or not

5
00:00:29,439 --> 00:00:33,269
Hi, welcome to Notions of Progress,
the show that traces ideas of progress

6
00:00:33,269 --> 00:00:34,779
from antiquity to the age of AI.

7
00:00:35,089 --> 00:00:39,669
In the last three episodes, we spent with
Matt Ehret following his argument that the

8
00:00:39,669 --> 00:00:44,319
history of progress is a struggle between
two competing visions of civilization,

9
00:00:45,109 --> 00:00:48,459
one that builds and one that extracts.

10
00:00:49,139 --> 00:00:51,859
At the end of that argument was
a framework you may remember

11
00:00:51,859 --> 00:00:56,019
from episode eleven, the open
system versus the closed system.

12
00:00:56,699 --> 00:01:00,569
An open system, on Ehret's account,
develops its internal capacities.

13
00:01:00,999 --> 00:01:04,219
A closed one manages and
depletes their capacities.

14
00:01:05,009 --> 00:01:08,659
That framework raised a question
we set aside at the time: What

15
00:01:08,659 --> 00:01:11,039
exactly is being opened or closed?

16
00:01:11,639 --> 00:01:14,749
What is the standard by which
we judge whether a civilization

17
00:01:14,749 --> 00:01:16,489
is developing or declining?

18
00:01:17,049 --> 00:01:21,559
What does it mean to say that a human
being or a society is flourishing?

19
00:01:22,319 --> 00:01:25,109
This, by very nature, is
a concept of progress.

20
00:01:26,319 --> 00:01:30,199
Aristotle had an answer, and it
begins with a question most of

21
00:01:30,199 --> 00:01:34,549
us stopped asking a long time
ago: What is a human being for?

22
00:01:35,749 --> 00:01:38,739
In this episode, we are going
to work through three ideas.

23
00:01:39,069 --> 00:01:42,399
First, how Aristotle
understands the relationship

24
00:01:42,409 --> 00:01:44,279
between activity and the good.

25
00:01:45,029 --> 00:01:47,619
Second, what he means by telos.

26
00:01:48,559 --> 00:01:53,589
Telos, the end or purpose internal
to a form of life, and why it

27
00:01:53,589 --> 00:01:56,929
is grounded in nature rather
than assigned from the outside.

28
00:01:57,359 --> 00:02:02,409
And third, a challenge we will carry
into part two, posed by Karl Popper

29
00:02:02,419 --> 00:02:07,669
about whether any fixed account of human
ends is compatible with an open society

30
00:02:09,853 --> 00:02:11,963
Three terms will carry the argument today.

31
00:02:12,633 --> 00:02:16,553
The first is telos from the
Greek meaning end or purpose.

32
00:02:17,263 --> 00:02:21,803
According to MacIntyre's reading
of Aristotle, the telos of a mind

33
00:02:21,823 --> 00:02:25,653
of a thing is the end that it
is internal to its form of life.

34
00:02:26,333 --> 00:02:31,003
What it means for a thing of
that kind to be functioning well.

35
00:02:31,383 --> 00:02:33,983
A telos is not-- it's
not a goal you choose.

36
00:02:34,093 --> 00:02:38,763
It is whether you are oriented toward
virtue of what you actually are.

37
00:02:39,953 --> 00:02:44,533
The second, eudaimonia, often
translated as happiness, but

38
00:02:44,543 --> 00:02:46,903
more precisely to flourish.

39
00:02:47,863 --> 00:02:52,613
For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the full
realization of what human beings are

40
00:02:52,623 --> 00:02:54,993
capable of, what they can become.

41
00:02:55,613 --> 00:02:59,883
It is a life lived well, not a
feeling we are trying to produce.

42
00:03:00,863 --> 00:03:05,943
The third term is phronesis, which
translates to practical wisdom.

43
00:03:06,573 --> 00:03:10,283
We will name it here and return to
it in depth in part two and in our

44
00:03:10,283 --> 00:03:14,733
upcoming episode with Professor Atif
Ansar, where it will do real work.

45
00:03:15,473 --> 00:03:20,303
For now, phronesis is the capacity to
judge well in particular situations.

46
00:03:20,743 --> 00:03:23,063
It is how telos meets the world

47
00:03:26,003 --> 00:03:31,913
The question of what a human being is
sounds like an ancient idea, a-and, and

48
00:03:31,913 --> 00:03:34,313
it well may be, but it has not gone away.

49
00:03:34,893 --> 00:03:39,553
When we design institutions such
as hospitals, schools, and cities,

50
00:03:39,903 --> 00:03:43,623
we are making assumptions about
what well-being consists in.

51
00:03:44,423 --> 00:03:49,043
We are assuming, at least implicitly, that
there is something it means for human life

52
00:03:49,053 --> 00:03:51,433
to be going well rather than going badly.

53
00:03:52,443 --> 00:03:55,933
Aristotle's argument is that these
assumptions need to be examined.

54
00:03:56,343 --> 00:03:58,203
They can't be left implicit.

55
00:03:58,993 --> 00:04:03,243
The episodes ahead will test
whether they can indeed be grounded

56
00:04:08,069 --> 00:04:13,529
Aristotle himself opens the Nicomachean
Ethics, his work, not with a principle or

57
00:04:13,529 --> 00:04:15,319
a commandment, but with an observation.

58
00:04:16,039 --> 00:04:21,609
Every activity, every inquiry, every
pursuit aims at some kind of good.

59
00:04:22,449 --> 00:04:27,169
Archery aims at hitting the target, for
example, or medicine aims at health.

60
00:04:27,949 --> 00:04:29,649
Strategy aims at victory.

61
00:04:30,129 --> 00:04:33,129
Politics, and this is the one that
Aristotle cares the most about,

62
00:04:33,179 --> 00:04:35,119
aims at the good of the community.

63
00:04:36,709 --> 00:04:40,549
The claim is not yet a claim about
the fundamental nature of things.

64
00:04:41,069 --> 00:04:44,359
It is a description of
how human activity works.

65
00:04:45,329 --> 00:04:48,799
On Aristotle's account, we
are purposive creatures.

66
00:04:48,859 --> 00:04:50,219
We act towards ends.

67
00:04:51,059 --> 00:04:55,549
The question he then asks is whether
there is a highest good, one that orders

68
00:04:55,549 --> 00:04:57,559
and makes sense of all the others.

69
00:04:59,369 --> 00:05:04,909
Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue,
his very well-known work on Aristotle,

70
00:05:05,219 --> 00:05:10,559
frames this as the foundational move
of the Aristotelian tradition, where

71
00:05:10,559 --> 00:05:15,269
enlightenment moral philosophy, on
MacIntyre's account, begins from rules,

72
00:05:15,709 --> 00:05:18,389
what should I do and why should I obey?

73
00:05:19,309 --> 00:05:22,029
Aristotle, conversely,
begins from character.

74
00:05:22,409 --> 00:05:24,149
What kind of person should I become?

75
00:05:24,609 --> 00:05:27,029
What does it mean for a human
being to be living well?

76
00:05:28,169 --> 00:05:33,659
So the key here is the shift from
virtue to rule following, MacIntyre

77
00:05:33,659 --> 00:05:38,279
argues, is the defining mark of
what went wrong in modern ethics.

78
00:05:38,889 --> 00:05:43,509
Rules without a prior account of what
human beings are for cannot carry the

79
00:05:43,509 --> 00:05:45,889
moral weight we ask of them, he claims.

80
00:05:48,099 --> 00:05:51,249
MacIntyre makes this point
with characteristic directness.

81
00:05:52,289 --> 00:05:55,169
Aristotle takes himself not to
be inventing an account of the

82
00:05:55,169 --> 00:05:59,009
virtues, but to be articulating
what is already implicit in thought.

83
00:06:00,789 --> 00:06:03,579
He is not constructing a
system from first principles.

84
00:06:03,859 --> 00:06:08,219
He is giving rational form to what
the best practice already assumes.

85
00:06:10,173 --> 00:06:13,673
MacIntyre walks through Aristotle's
arguments against the rival

86
00:06:13,673 --> 00:06:15,223
candidates for the highest good.

87
00:06:16,533 --> 00:06:19,983
Money, he claims, is always pursued
for the sake of something else.

88
00:06:19,993 --> 00:06:22,983
It is never a final end, a final good.

89
00:06:24,193 --> 00:06:26,503
Honor depends on the opinion of others.

90
00:06:26,893 --> 00:06:29,663
What it means cannot
be the good in itself.

91
00:06:31,263 --> 00:06:35,323
Additionally, pleasure accompanies
successful activity, but it

92
00:06:35,333 --> 00:06:38,883
does not constitute it, meaning
that pleasure is not a good in

93
00:06:38,883 --> 00:06:40,533
itself according to this model.

94
00:06:42,023 --> 00:06:46,753
The name Aristotle gives to the highest
good, the overarching good, is eudaimonia.

95
00:06:48,013 --> 00:06:52,713
The translation is genuinely difficult,
but it roughly equates to something

96
00:06:52,713 --> 00:06:54,493
along the lines of flourishing.

97
00:06:55,303 --> 00:06:59,053
This is an important concept, and
MacIntyre suggests that we think of

98
00:06:59,053 --> 00:07:04,243
it as being well and doing well, a
state in which a person is both in good

99
00:07:04,243 --> 00:07:06,973
condition and acting from that condition.

100
00:07:08,783 --> 00:07:10,923
So what does eudaimonia consist in?

101
00:07:11,683 --> 00:07:14,703
Well, MacIntyre, reading
Aristotle carefully in this point,

102
00:07:14,713 --> 00:07:19,213
distinguishes two senses of the
relationship between means and ends.

103
00:07:19,553 --> 00:07:20,423
This is the heart.

104
00:07:21,463 --> 00:07:25,253
In one sense, means and end are separable.

105
00:07:25,833 --> 00:07:28,823
You can achieve the same
end by different means.

106
00:07:29,663 --> 00:07:35,153
But MacIntyre argues that for Aristotle,
the virtues, courage, justice,

107
00:07:35,293 --> 00:07:39,703
practical wisdom, temperance, are not
related to eudaimonia in that way.

108
00:07:40,213 --> 00:07:45,783
What constitutes a complete human life
lived at its best already includes

109
00:07:45,783 --> 00:07:47,353
the exercise of these virtues.

110
00:07:47,383 --> 00:07:49,283
So in other words, this isn't the pathway.

111
00:07:49,303 --> 00:07:51,193
This is already part of how they operate.

112
00:07:52,203 --> 00:07:56,093
They are, in MacIntyre's reading,
partly constitutive of the end.

113
00:07:57,993 --> 00:08:01,563
They are, in MacIntyre's reading,
partly constitutive of the end,

114
00:08:01,973 --> 00:08:03,663
not merely instrumental to it.

115
00:08:05,593 --> 00:08:10,193
So what MacIntyre's reading of Aristotle
turns on is this: the question of how to

116
00:08:10,193 --> 00:08:14,423
live well cannot be separated from the
question of what kind of a person to be.

117
00:08:14,763 --> 00:08:16,063
The two are one and the same.

118
00:08:17,243 --> 00:08:19,883
The highest good is not a
target you hit by the right

119
00:08:19,883 --> 00:08:21,223
sequence of actions, therefore.

120
00:08:21,223 --> 00:08:25,423
It is a form of life that you inhabit
through the cultivation of character

121
00:08:28,785 --> 00:08:31,565
One of the most persistent
problems in reading Aristotle is

122
00:08:31,565 --> 00:08:33,305
a misreading that often occurs.

123
00:08:34,515 --> 00:08:38,685
Scholars who have spent careers
defending Aristotle's account of telos,

124
00:08:38,865 --> 00:08:43,225
including Philippa Foot and Alasdair
MacIntyre, often begin by addressing

125
00:08:43,235 --> 00:08:47,165
a suspicion that attaches itself to
the concept almost automatically.

126
00:08:48,295 --> 00:08:53,335
And it goes like this, that any fixed
account of what human beings are for

127
00:08:53,355 --> 00:08:56,205
must be at bottom a blueprint of control.

128
00:08:56,675 --> 00:09:00,715
This is their interpretation of
how people misinterpret Aristotle,

129
00:09:01,775 --> 00:09:03,285
and it turns into a suspicion.

130
00:09:03,845 --> 00:09:05,405
The suspicion runs like this.

131
00:09:06,205 --> 00:09:10,455
If there is a fixed end built into
human nature, they claim that this is

132
00:09:10,495 --> 00:09:17,345
Aristotle's motives, then someone, a
philosopher, a priest, a state, must be

133
00:09:17,345 --> 00:09:19,645
in a position to specify and enforce it.

134
00:09:20,685 --> 00:09:25,765
So both Foot and MacIntyre both argued
that this suspicion, however, though

135
00:09:25,975 --> 00:09:31,295
understandable, rests on a fundamental
confusion on their part about how this

136
00:09:31,315 --> 00:09:33,805
kind of evaluation actually works.

137
00:09:34,535 --> 00:09:37,505
Understanding that confusion
is the work of this section.

138
00:09:38,045 --> 00:09:42,655
Philippa Foot, in her work Natural
Goodness, provides an account of

139
00:09:42,725 --> 00:09:44,805
how this kind of evaluation works.

140
00:09:45,435 --> 00:09:47,655
Her argument starts with a simple example.

141
00:09:48,585 --> 00:09:53,365
When we say that a wolf is defective
because it cannot run, we're not imposing

142
00:09:53,365 --> 00:09:55,055
an external standard onto the wolf.

143
00:09:55,575 --> 00:10:00,345
We're recognizing something about what
a wolf is, the essence of that wolf.

144
00:10:01,365 --> 00:10:04,565
So what it needs to do to
live and flourish as a wolf.

145
00:10:05,065 --> 00:10:09,085
The evaluation is grounded in the
natural form of life of the species.

146
00:10:09,695 --> 00:10:15,005
So a wolf with defective legs is, in a
perfectly straightforward sense, a bad

147
00:10:15,005 --> 00:10:19,975
wolf, not because we disapprove of it, but
because it is failing to be what a wolf

148
00:10:19,975 --> 00:10:23,325
character, characteristically is and does.

149
00:10:24,175 --> 00:10:26,605
So Foot extends this
logic to human beings.

150
00:10:27,505 --> 00:10:31,225
What counts as a good human life
is similarly grounded in what human

151
00:10:31,225 --> 00:10:36,425
beings are, their characteristic
form of life, their natural ends.

152
00:10:37,725 --> 00:10:40,825
And this is Aristotle's telos
argument made in the language

153
00:10:40,835 --> 00:10:42,155
of contemporary philosophy.

154
00:10:42,815 --> 00:10:47,305
Without the theological premises and
without appeal to medieval frameworks.

155
00:10:47,995 --> 00:10:51,915
So Foot's argument is that the old
objection, you cannot derive what

156
00:10:51,945 --> 00:10:57,355
ought to be from what is, does not
apply to evaluations of living things.

157
00:10:58,985 --> 00:11:03,455
Saying what a number-- Saying what
a member of a natural kind needs in

158
00:11:03,455 --> 00:11:07,945
order to function well on her account
is a ki-- it's like a factual claim.

159
00:11:08,875 --> 00:11:11,195
So at this point, we need to
make a distinction that will

160
00:11:11,245 --> 00:11:13,135
prevent serious misunderstanding.

161
00:11:13,475 --> 00:11:17,915
One that has given some of the most
influential criticism of Aristotle,

162
00:11:17,925 --> 00:11:19,635
including the one we are about to examine.

163
00:11:21,299 --> 00:11:25,449
So Aro- Aristotle holds in his
work, De Anima, that the intellect

164
00:11:25,449 --> 00:11:27,779
begins without innate content.

165
00:11:28,589 --> 00:11:32,129
This, this is a term we're gonna
introduce here that you've heard before.

166
00:11:32,909 --> 00:11:36,769
What he's saying is, the mind at
birth is like a writing tablet on

167
00:11:36,769 --> 00:11:38,529
which nothing has been inscribed.

168
00:11:38,939 --> 00:11:43,519
This is often referred to as, as
Aristotle's idea of tabula rasa.

169
00:11:44,419 --> 00:11:48,029
All knowledge, he claims,
comes through the senses and

170
00:11:48,029 --> 00:11:49,969
is built up through experience.

171
00:11:50,429 --> 00:11:55,319
This is Aristotle's account of how we come
to know things, our epistemological path.

172
00:11:56,849 --> 00:11:58,839
But there's an important
distinction to note here.

173
00:11:59,319 --> 00:12:02,679
His account of how we come to
know things is not the same

174
00:12:03,339 --> 00:12:05,059
as his account of what we are.

175
00:12:05,069 --> 00:12:07,799
So that's where the
confusion often creeps in.

176
00:12:08,489 --> 00:12:12,729
The claim that human beings have
a telos, a natural end internal

177
00:12:12,729 --> 00:12:17,749
to their form, is not a claim
about what we are born knowing.

178
00:12:18,139 --> 00:12:20,779
It is a claim about what we actually are.

179
00:12:22,979 --> 00:12:26,329
A blank state in terms of
knowledge is entirely compatible

180
00:12:26,329 --> 00:12:28,019
with a determinant natural form.

181
00:12:28,889 --> 00:12:33,649
So we often hear about the acorn
does not know it's going to become

182
00:12:33,649 --> 00:12:37,969
an oak tree, but it is nonetheless
going to become an oak tree.

183
00:12:38,749 --> 00:12:43,569
In MacIntyre's reading of Aristotle,
the form of the human good is

184
00:12:43,579 --> 00:12:45,109
not what we are born knowing.

185
00:12:45,489 --> 00:12:50,389
It is what Aristotle holds we are
oriented towards by virtue of what we are.

186
00:12:51,749 --> 00:12:56,719
So by treating Aristotle's openness about
how we come to know things as license for

187
00:12:56,719 --> 00:13:01,869
the conclusion that human nature is in
itself plastic and endlessly revisable,

188
00:13:02,339 --> 00:13:07,009
that is, according to MacIntyre, the root
error in some of the most influential

189
00:13:07,029 --> 00:13:09,579
criticisms of Aristotelian ethics.

190
00:13:11,449 --> 00:13:15,729
MacIntyre's entire defense of
Aristotle depends on keeping these

191
00:13:15,729 --> 00:13:17,479
two things absolutely separate.

192
00:13:19,029 --> 00:13:22,699
We need to keep that in mind
when we turn to our last person,

193
00:13:23,319 --> 00:13:25,629
our last theorist, Karl Popper.

194
00:13:26,979 --> 00:13:30,519
What Foot and MacIntyre both
argue is that the telos is not a

195
00:13:30,519 --> 00:13:32,479
specification imposed from the outside.

196
00:13:33,329 --> 00:13:37,269
It is on their reading of Aristotle,
the internal logic of a form of

197
00:13:37,269 --> 00:13:41,009
life, what it means for a thing of
that kind to be functioning well.

198
00:13:41,789 --> 00:13:44,969
The blank state is about
how we come to know.

199
00:13:45,259 --> 00:13:47,359
This is back to the tabula rasa.

200
00:13:47,359 --> 00:13:49,849
So these things have to be
understood in a separate way.

201
00:13:49,859 --> 00:13:53,629
The human form is about what
we are, not what we know.

202
00:13:54,729 --> 00:13:56,699
Well, here is what Karl Popper charges

203
00:13:59,987 --> 00:14:03,777
In his well-known work, The Open Society
and Its Enemies, published in nineteen

204
00:14:03,787 --> 00:14:08,597
forty-five, he directs a sustained and
serious argument against Aristotle.

205
00:14:09,587 --> 00:14:13,247
Popper is not a careless thinker, and his
charge is not that Aristotle was a bad

206
00:14:13,247 --> 00:14:15,907
person or he had authoritarian intentions.

207
00:14:16,417 --> 00:14:17,637
The charge is structural.

208
00:14:18,287 --> 00:14:22,527
Specifically, his ideas about essence
and his account of change moving

209
00:14:22,527 --> 00:14:27,387
towards a fixed end, telos, generates
the intellectual architecture

210
00:14:27,397 --> 00:14:31,297
of the closed society, whether
Aristotle intended this or not.

211
00:14:31,577 --> 00:14:33,177
So you hear what, what
Popper is saying here.

212
00:14:33,187 --> 00:14:37,357
He's basically saying that because
of the acorn and the oak tree

213
00:14:37,427 --> 00:14:42,257
example that we discussed, he sees
this as a, as an archytype which

214
00:14:42,257 --> 00:14:46,577
describes a closed society, which
is what Popper is arguing against.

215
00:14:48,097 --> 00:14:52,047
At the center of Popper's argument
is Aristotle's concept of telos, the

216
00:14:52,047 --> 00:14:57,377
very idea that we've been working
with this in this episode, that every

217
00:14:57,387 --> 00:15:01,417
developing thing carries within itself
the seed of what it is moving towards.

218
00:15:01,977 --> 00:15:06,307
So Popper's argument is, uh, in
chapter eleven, is that this concept,

219
00:15:06,647 --> 00:15:09,837
however innocent it may appear in
Aristotle's account of nature and

220
00:15:09,837 --> 00:15:14,847
biology, becomes politically dangerous
when taken by others and when applied

221
00:15:14,857 --> 00:15:17,787
to peoples, nations, and states.

222
00:15:19,057 --> 00:15:25,087
So Popper's argument runs as follows:
For Aristotle, change is the realization

223
00:15:25,097 --> 00:15:30,107
of potentialities already present in
a thing's inner nature of what we are.

224
00:15:31,037 --> 00:15:34,557
The form or essence of a developing
thing stands at the end of its

225
00:15:34,557 --> 00:15:36,187
development, not at the beginning.

226
00:15:37,407 --> 00:15:43,147
And this generates what Popper identifies
as three ideas that later on Hegel will

227
00:15:43,147 --> 00:15:45,107
later inherit and push to their extreme.

228
00:15:45,807 --> 00:15:50,875
First That we can only know a
thing's inner nature through

229
00:15:50,875 --> 00:15:52,255
its historical development.

230
00:15:53,285 --> 00:15:57,715
Second, that development reveals a destiny
that once there was from the beginning,

231
00:15:57,745 --> 00:16:00,235
a kind of inescapable, essential fate.

232
00:16:00,535 --> 00:16:05,135
And third, that the inner nature must
unfold through change to become fully

233
00:16:05,135 --> 00:16:10,005
real, which means that self-assertion
and the drive to realize one essential

234
00:16:10,005 --> 00:16:14,185
nature become the fundamental categories
of both personal and political life.

235
00:16:16,195 --> 00:16:19,875
Well, the political implication on
Popper's reading is significant.

236
00:16:20,725 --> 00:16:26,315
If a person or a state has a hidden
inner nature that history is in the

237
00:16:26,315 --> 00:16:31,175
process of realizing, then political
institutions can claim to be the

238
00:16:31,185 --> 00:16:32,965
instruments of that realization.

239
00:16:33,835 --> 00:16:35,265
So this is very interesting, right?

240
00:16:35,265 --> 00:16:39,675
Because here he's describing, uh,
a built-in script, a powerlessness,

241
00:16:39,715 --> 00:16:42,745
if, if you will, of these political
institutions for something

242
00:16:42,745 --> 00:16:44,835
that's unfolding its own destiny.

243
00:16:45,695 --> 00:16:48,605
And a claim of that kind is not
easily subject to democratic

244
00:16:48,605 --> 00:16:51,965
revision, so it's very difficult
for people to refute when presented.

245
00:16:52,925 --> 00:16:55,375
You cannot vote against
what history requires.

246
00:16:55,705 --> 00:16:56,885
That's his basic argument.

247
00:16:57,465 --> 00:16:59,875
You cannot reform what essence demands.

248
00:17:00,505 --> 00:17:05,035
The closed society, therefore, for
Popper, is one in which political

249
00:17:05,045 --> 00:17:09,835
authority insulates itself from criticism
by just appealing to a necessity that

250
00:17:09,845 --> 00:17:12,245
transcends ordinary deliberation.

251
00:17:13,585 --> 00:17:18,105
Aristotle's telos then, on Popper's
account, is where the insulation begins.

252
00:17:18,895 --> 00:17:22,375
And Popper's charge is serious, and
it deserves to be taken seriously.

253
00:17:23,155 --> 00:17:27,205
MacIntyre, as we will see in part
two, argues that Popper has misread

254
00:17:27,215 --> 00:17:31,665
the relationship between telos and
political authority in Aristotle.

255
00:17:31,875 --> 00:17:34,725
So this goes back to what we were
talking about, that there's a

256
00:17:34,725 --> 00:17:40,905
separation between what we are and
how we learn, and this is essentially

257
00:17:40,905 --> 00:17:44,895
what, what he believes, what MacIntyre
believes that Popper is conflating.

258
00:17:46,385 --> 00:17:50,215
Telos, on MacIntyre's reading, provides
the standard by which political

259
00:17:50,215 --> 00:17:54,365
arrangements are judged, but not the
authority that exempts them from judgment.

260
00:17:55,315 --> 00:17:59,535
The tradition that runs from Aristotle
through Aquinas generates natural law as a

261
00:17:59,535 --> 00:18:04,885
constraint on political power, a standard
against which rulers can be found wanting

262
00:18:06,899 --> 00:18:09,149
But we'll talk more about
that in episode two.

263
00:18:09,469 --> 00:18:13,229
For now, the charge stands as the
question the episode is organized

264
00:18:13,229 --> 00:18:18,909
around, and it goes like this: Can a
fixed account of human ends, of telos,

265
00:18:19,329 --> 00:18:21,609
be compatible with an open society?

266
00:18:22,909 --> 00:18:27,069
And is Aristotle's telos the kind of
fixed account that Popper thinks it is?

267
00:18:28,709 --> 00:18:30,899
Popper's charge is not
answered in part one.

268
00:18:30,909 --> 00:18:34,359
It is posed a question and in
part two, and we will address it.

269
00:18:34,799 --> 00:18:38,349
It is a genuine question, and
it is not easily dismissible.

270
00:18:39,239 --> 00:18:44,289
So in closing, what this episode has
traced through MacIntyre's and Foot's

271
00:18:44,299 --> 00:18:48,029
reading of Aristotle is a framework
built on a single foundational claim,

272
00:18:48,629 --> 00:18:52,299
that there is such a thing as human
form of life, and that living well

273
00:18:52,299 --> 00:18:54,359
means realizing that form of life.

274
00:18:55,909 --> 00:18:59,939
Aristotle begins with the observation
that every activity aims at some

275
00:18:59,939 --> 00:19:03,549
kind of good, and whether there is
a highest good that makes the others

276
00:19:03,549 --> 00:19:06,079
intelligible, this is his claim.

277
00:19:06,669 --> 00:19:10,629
He identifies that good as
what he defines as eudaimonia.

278
00:19:11,569 --> 00:19:15,309
It's not a feeling to be produced,
but a form of life to be lived.

279
00:19:15,389 --> 00:19:18,749
And he, he grounds it in an
account of human nature, what a

280
00:19:18,749 --> 00:19:22,799
human being is for internal to
the form of life of that species.

281
00:19:23,139 --> 00:19:25,999
So what the episode has also
drawn is a distinction that

282
00:19:25,999 --> 00:19:27,429
will matter going forward.

283
00:19:28,599 --> 00:19:32,849
Aristotle's account of how we come
to know things holds that the mind

284
00:19:32,849 --> 00:19:34,879
begins without innate content.

285
00:19:35,319 --> 00:19:38,459
This is a repeat of what we
discussed before, the tabula rasa.

286
00:19:39,199 --> 00:19:42,889
His account of what we are holds
that human nature is not therefore

287
00:19:42,899 --> 00:19:45,419
blank or i- infinitely malleable.

288
00:19:45,779 --> 00:19:49,039
Those are things that are claims
at two completely different levels.

289
00:19:49,669 --> 00:19:53,159
The first does not undermine
the second, as Popper claimed.

290
00:19:53,509 --> 00:19:57,139
And we've introduced Popper's
charge that Aristotle's idea about

291
00:19:57,179 --> 00:20:01,529
essence and fixed ends generate the
intellectual architecture for the

292
00:20:01,529 --> 00:20:06,199
closed society, which he sees as a very
dangerous thing, especially following

293
00:20:06,199 --> 00:20:07,799
the, the events of World War II.

294
00:20:07,799 --> 00:20:07,819
In

295
00:20:10,109 --> 00:20:14,229
part two, we will ask whether Aristotle's
account means for practical wisdom,

296
00:20:14,719 --> 00:20:17,839
for the capacity to judge well in
particular situations, and whether

297
00:20:17,839 --> 00:20:21,609
MacIntyre's defense of Aristotle against
Popper can actually be sustained.

298
00:20:22,679 --> 00:20:26,589
The question this series keeps returning
to over and over is whether progress

299
00:20:26,589 --> 00:20:31,479
itself requires a prior account of
what we are progressing towards.

300
00:20:31,569 --> 00:20:33,899
So that's the question about telos.

301
00:20:34,439 --> 00:20:38,499
Aristotle thinks it does, and he thinks
he knows what that account looks like.

302
00:20:39,689 --> 00:20:41,279
Part two will be out in two weeks.

303
00:20:42,009 --> 00:20:46,329
The sources for both episodes, the
Nicomachean Ethics, MacIntyre's

304
00:20:46,339 --> 00:20:50,119
After Virtue, and Philippa Foot's
Natural Goodness, and Popper's Open

305
00:20:50,119 --> 00:20:52,599
Society are all in the show notes.

306
00:20:54,907 --> 00:20:56,177
Thanks so much for listening today.

307
00:20:56,217 --> 00:20:57,787
We look forward to
seeing you the next time

308
00:21:00,436 --> 00:21:03,456
If you enjoyed this episode, you
can find "Notions of Progress" on

309
00:21:03,456 --> 00:21:06,026
YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify.

310
00:21:06,296 --> 00:21:09,586
And all the sources, reading
recommendations, and further context

311
00:21:09,596 --> 00:21:11,546
for every episode are in the show notes.

312
00:21:12,086 --> 00:21:16,156
If you are enjoying this series, liking
the episode on YouTube and signing up for

313
00:21:16,166 --> 00:21:21,376
the newsletter at notionsofprogress.com
really helps more people find these ideas.

314
00:21:21,946 --> 00:21:26,466
For those who wanna go even deeper,
the Curator's Flame blog and Substack

315
00:21:26,496 --> 00:21:30,346
newsletter accompany each episode with
the questions the scholarship leaves open.

316
00:21:31,026 --> 00:21:34,276
I'm Marshall, tracing ideas
of progress from antiquity to

317
00:21:34,276 --> 00:21:38,126
the age of AI and leaving the
debates open for you to consider.

318
00:21:38,396 --> 00:21:39,306
Until next time