Aristotle on Human Nature — Blueprint vs. Destiny

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Aristotle's' question about human purpose
is old enough and central enough that

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five serious thinkers can each take
a real run at it without any of them

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being simply dismissed out of hand
as being wrong or incorrect by their

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supporters or their detractors alike

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Hi, welcome to Notions of Progress,
the show that traces ideas of progress

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from antiquity to the age of AI.

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In our last episode, we set out
Aristotle's basic claim that every

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living thing has a telos, a built-in
purpose, and for a human being, that

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purpose is eudaimonia, which translates
to flourishing, a life well-lived by

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doing what a human being actually is for.

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We also drew out a distinction that
turns out to matter a great deal.

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How we come to know things and what we
actually are, are two separate questions.

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A mind that starts out blank, a tabula
rasa, if you will, fitting in through

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experience is entirely compatible with
a human nature that isn't blank at all.

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This episode brings five thinkers
into discourse, each looking at

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the claim from a different angle.

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Across two and a half thousand years, Karl
Popper, writing after the Second World

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War, worried that fixed ideas of human
purpose is dangerous in the wrong hands.

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Alasdair MacIntyre thinks Aristotle
survives that worry for reasons that

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don't even depend on the assumption
that Popper was most worried about.

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Hans-Georg Gadamer asks what it
actually looks like moment to

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moment to act on a purpose like
the one that Aristotle describes.

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Dr. Philippa Foot asks whether we can
call something genuinely good for a

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human being at all without just dressing
up a personal opinion as philosophy.

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And lastly, Professor Shannon Vallor
brings a contemporary view, and

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she takes the same question and
points it at the most consequential

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technology we're building right
now: artificial intelligence.

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We're not here to decide on which
perspective is correct or not.

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These are just presenting five serious
perspectives, one shared question, each

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landing somewhere a little bit different.

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So hopefully, that will be
the shape of this episode.

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Now, some of these five are
answering each other directly.

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Some are standing in different places,
while others are looking at the

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same mountain from a different side.

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And two words are worth
holding onto before we begin.

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Telos is a thing's built-in purpose.

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We've seen this word before in
previous episodes, as well as the next

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word, which is probably one of the
most important terms that we will go

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through during this episode, phronesis,
which translates to practical wisdom.

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It's not cleverness in the abstract, not
a rule you can memorize and apply the

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same way every time, but it's actually
the skill of judging correctly what a

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particular claim, situation actually calls
for right in front of you in real time.

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You could say it's the difference
between knowing a general principle and

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knowing what to actually do with it.

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We'll come back to phronesis in
real depth later on in the episode.

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It's the thread running under
almost everything that we're going

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to discuss So now let's take a
little bit of a look at Popper.

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Karl Popper -- a philosopher of science
best known for arguing that a genuine

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scientific theory must be falsifiable.

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It must be possible, at least
in principle, to prove it wrong.

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This was one of his very
well-known theories.

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In one of his well-known books, The
Open Society and Its Enemies, which he

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published in nineteen forty-five, Popper
turns out that same standard on political

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philosophy and identifies Aristotle as a
key source of what he calls historicism.

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This is an important term,, and it's
been defined differently during different

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periods of time by different scholars.

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Now, historicism in Popper's own
definition is the view that history

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unfolds according to a hidden
law or a destiny, and that this

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law could be known in advance.

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That political and social change follows
a fixed direction, the way a species

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follows its inner nature towards maturity.

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Now, Popper argues that this
view treats the course of history

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the same way Aristotle treats
the growth of living things.

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So this is the analogy that
H-Popper brings on to and

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engages Aristotle's idea in.

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And as the gradual realization of
an essence of what that present

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was from the very beginning.

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So Popper traces this to three
specific claims he identifies

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in Aristotle's account.

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First, that a thing's hidden
nature can only be known through

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observing its historical development.

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Second, that what happens to a
thing flows from that thing's

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essential built-in destiny.

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And again, Popper is looking
at Aristotle's, as he perceives

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Aristotle's conception here.

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And third, that an essence must assert
itself in order to become fully real.

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Now, if you apply this to biology, Popper
notes, these claims are unremarkable.

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So as Aristotle had referenced, an acorn's
nature is revealed as it becomes an oak.

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Now, Popper's argument is that Hegel
later took these same three claims

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and applied them to nations and
to individuals within a society,

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and turning a biological framework
into a theory of political destiny.

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And this is the doctrine that
Popper calls historicism.

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It's that destiny.

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So Popper's stated concern
with historicism as he saw it,

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is that it removes political
arrangements from ordinary scrutiny.

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And if a society's course is dictated by
a destiny that is already fixed, then the

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existing authorities during that time can
present themselves as the fulfillment of

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that destiny rather than a set of choices
open to challenge or revision, which

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would occur in a democracy as he saw it.

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So Popper's explicit that his critique
targ- targets Hegel's use of these

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ideas and the political theory Hegel
built from them, not Aristotle's

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biology considered on its own terms.

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Now, whether Aristotle's own claims
about telos already contain what

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Hegel later develops, or whether that
connection belongs to Hegel alone, is the

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question that the rest of this episode
works through from several different

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directions and other perspectives.

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Now, another commentator on Aristotle,
very well known, is Alasdair MacIntyre.

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He spent decades trying to recover
Aristotle from, for readers who

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had been taught to be suspicious
of him, essentially like Popper.

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His answer to Popper's
worry is very direct.

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MacIntyre argues that Aristotle's
actual account never leaves the level

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of a single person's life, and that
the community immediately around

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them is not a part of this equation.

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It is not a claim about
a nation's destiny.

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That larger, more dangerous version
of the idea belongs to Hegel.

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This is what MacIntyre argued,
and working centuries after

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Aristotle, but not, sh-should not
be attributed to Aristotle himself.

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So that's his main defense of
Aristotle, was that Hegel was

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putting this idea and others were
using this to put it onto Aristotle

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when it was not his to begin with.

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Well, then MacIntyre goes a step
further, and this is the part

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worth really, taking notice of.

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He says his own defense of Aristotle
does not even need the idea that Popper

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was concerned with, the idea of a hidden
nature waiting to unfold over time.

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So instead, M-MacIntyre grounds a good
life in what he calls the day-to-day

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practices, things like a craft, a
sport, or a shared body of work,

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each with its own internal standards
that a person learns by doing them in

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practice, often alongside other people.

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So you do not discover some hidden
essence sitting inside you, he claims.

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You develop into the kind of person
that going through the practices makes

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you to be, through actually doing it.

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So MacIntyre's account of practices turns
on a distinction he treats as essential,

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internal goods versus external goods.

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External goods, money, status, prestige,
can be gotten more than one way, and

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when one person has more of them, there's
less available for everybody else.

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But internal goods work differently.

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They can be achieved only by engaging in
the practice itself, and achieving them

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benefits the entire community of people
who practice it, not just the individual.

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So MacIntyre's own example
is a child taught to play

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chess for candy, for example.

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As long as candy is the only reason
to play, he argues, the child has

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every reason to cheat whenever they
feel they can get away with it.

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But once the child comes to value what
is specific to chess, real strategic

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skill, honest, honestly earned through
competition, he no longer cheats.

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He or she no longer cheats.

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Making sense because the child would
not be, would only be defeating

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themselves, and they would understand
this based on common sense,

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not only outside reward giving.

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So this is the distinction that grounds
MacIntyre's account of virtue directly.

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Qualities like honesty, justice, and
courage, they're not external rules

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imposed on a practice from outside.

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They are what makes achieving a practice
internal goods possible to begin with.

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So that is a much more social,
historical story about virtue than the

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one that Popper seems to be picturing.

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There is a real tragedy and real
disagreement built into it too 'Cause

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Ma-MacIntyre also points out that a
person's different practices, family

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life and craft, civic duty, can
genuinely pull against one another.

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There's a tension.

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Someone devoted to their art might have
to choose, for example, at some real cost

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between the demands of that work and the
demands of the people who depend on them.

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So a single imposed blueprint would
not allow for that kind of conflict.

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If this blueprint was what Popper is
asse- was asserting, and so MacIntyre

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is saying, "No, that, that just
wouldn't work for the individual."

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A blueprint just tells you the answer.

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MacIntyre's Aristotle, therefore, does
allow for it, because real practices

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genuinely can pull in different
directions all at the same time,

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'cause they're based on judgment.

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That's the part that's from within.

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Now, another well-known theorist,
Hans-Georg Gadamer, a twentieth-century

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philosopher, so he turns to Aristotle's
text and he, he's asking what kind

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of knowledge phronesis actually is.

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He wants to get to the essence of
that term that we discussed above.

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And so he starts from a single
observation, and he states the following:

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"A craft can be learned, and it can
also be forgotten, but moral knowledge

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cannot. We do not stand outside our own
lives deciding whether to acquire it."

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So it's not something that we acquire
from the outside, which is something

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that we discussed with the Sophists
many episodes ago, the way we might

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decide to pick up a skill or a craft.

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And we are always already in the middle
of situations that require us to act,

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which means we must already possess
that judgment, that skill from within.

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So Gadamer works this out through
Aristotle's own example Administering

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justice looks at first like a craft,
for example, applying laws and

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rules to a case in front of you.

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This would be in the case of a
judge, the way a craftsperson

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applies a design to material.

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But Aristotle calls what a judge
exercises phronesis, not techne.

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So he doesn't consider the judgment
that a judge exercises to be a skill.

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He sees this from within.

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A law is always written in general
terms, and general terms can't

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anticipate every particular case.

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But when a judge tempers the strict letter
of a law because applying it in full

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would be wrong in this case instance,
Aristotle calls that epikeia or equity,

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and treats it as a correction of the law.

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So the judge is applying
judgment to the law, and it's

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not a departure from the law.

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A craftsperson who deviates from his own
desti simply has failed to execute it.

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So that's the case for the craftsperson.

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A judge, however, who tempers the law
in the name of what it actually is doing

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based on right and wrong, is basically
doing exactly what phronesis is for.

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So Gadamer draws out a further
distinction between means and ends

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In a craft, the end is fixed before
you start, and all that is left is

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choosing the best means to reach it.

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What you're going to build,
what you're going to create.

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But in moral knowledge, the end
itself is not settled in advance

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because there is no telos to it.

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There is no anterior certainty about what
good life is ai-- So for example, in the

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case of judgment and living a good life,
there's no anterior certainty about what

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a good life is aiming at as a whole.

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That means that even the choice of means
becomes a moral choice along the way,

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and it's not merely a technical one.

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And finally, Gadamer follows
Aristotle in naming the danger

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built into this same capacity.

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Aristotle has a word, tyrannos,
for someone with every natural

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gift for practical judgment
and no virtue in guiding it.

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So this is a person who has
these natural-born gifts but

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doesn't know how to exercise it.

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So in this case, what makes this person
genuinely alarming is not a lack of skill.

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The person possesses the
skills, it's the exact opposite.

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So as Gadamer puts it, following
Aristotle, "There is nothing

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so terrible or such a waste, so
uncanny, so appalling as the exercise

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of brilliant talents for evil."

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So this is a question of
possessing these great skills but

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not putting them to a good end.

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And this is what he sees as
being a complete contradiction

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to Aristotle's position.

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So put this together.

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This is Gadamer's answer to Popper.

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He says a technique could be taught,
handed down, it's a skill, and

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applied the same way in every case.

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And that uniformity is exactly what
makes it usable as a blueprint.

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So that's the blueprint that Gadamer
is referring to, and that's what he

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thinks that Aristotle is referring
to, but not in the way that Popper

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is applying it to an entire society.

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So phronesis, however, cannot work that
way, and this is the distinction he makes.

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It only exists within a live situation
because it's exercised by a particular

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person facing something that will
never repeat exactly the same again.

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And so his basic conclusion was that if
Aristotle's telos operated through fixed

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rules, this blueprint, then Popper's
fear would be justified But Gadamer

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believed, and he wrote, that this is
not what Aristotle's text actually said.

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Another important perspective is by
Dr. Philippa Foot, and she spent a

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very long career defending some very
strange but some very interesting ideas.

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Philippa Foot spent much of her career
defending a very old-fashioned sounding

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idea that some things are simply
factually good or bad for a living

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creature, simple as that, whether we
personally approve of them or not.

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And philosophers have long worried that
you cannot get a should out of an is.

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And so this is basically looking at
the situation of an objective good.

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They're pushing back on this, and
they're saying that simply describing

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facts about the world can never
by itself tell you what is good or

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bad, that it's a subjective thing.

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Foot, however, spent much of her
career arguing that this worry does

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not actually apply to living things,
and she raises the example of a wolf.

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And she says, so she says, "If a wolf
has damaged legs and it can't keep

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up with the pack, then we would call
that wolf defective, not because we

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dislike the wolf, but because we are
tracking a plain fact about the wolf

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and what that wolf needs to survive."

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So Dr. Foot's argument is that this
kind of judgment is not us protecting an

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opinion onto the wolf from the outside.

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It's just a factual claim about a
living thing, an objective claim, and

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it's grounded in what that particular
kind of creature actually is, the

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blueprint of the wolf, if you will.

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So then Dr.

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Foot extends this same
logic to human beings.

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Claims about, you know, what
makes a human life go well, so she

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argues, are the same kind of claim.

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They're just facts.

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They're grounded in what a human being
actually is and not just one person's

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preference dressed up as a philosophy.

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So she's basically making the
argument that there's an objective

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goodness in human beings.

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This blueprint that she is as-ascribing
to Aristotle's ideas here are about

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a blueprint towards some kind of a
good So that gives Aristotle's whole

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argument something solid to stand on
without needing to appeal to religion

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or any grand theory about the universe.

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And on, on her account, there is simply
a fact, a fact of the matter about what

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it means for a human life to flourish.

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The same way there is a fact of the
matter about what it means for a

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wolf to go on and survive or not.

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So just consider what this
means for something like the

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idea of honesty or courage.

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So on Foot's account, calling honesty
a virtue is not just a matter of taste.

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It's not a subjective thing, the
way preferring one style of music

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to another is a matter of taste.

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That would be something subjective.

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Now she's saying that it's closer
to saying a heart that pumps

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blood well is a good heart.

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She just thinks it's an objective fact.

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Human beings are the kind of creature
for whom things like trust, cooperation,

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and long-term planning are simply part
of what it takes to live well, the

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way running is simply part of what
it takes for a wolf to live well.

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So she's making a very
interesting argument here.

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She's essentially saying, being
good, this is part of what it takes

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for humans to survive, that it's…
in that sense, the concept of

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00:18:36,980 --> 00:18:40,540
goodness is built-in, built into that
blueprint that we're talking about.

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So Foot's whole argument turns on
treating good for a human being as

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00:18:45,100 --> 00:18:47,020
that same kind of factual claim.

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00:18:47,750 --> 00:18:50,610
It's not a matter of personal
taste trapped up in fancy language.

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It's merely a fact.

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And we're going to conclude on a
contemporary example, and we're going

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to turn to a theorist Dr. Shannon
Vallor, who examines the role of

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00:19:00,770 --> 00:19:04,580
ethics and social relations in the
evolution of technology, and most

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specifically, its relationship to AI.

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You might be saying, "Why are we
talking about AI at the same time

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we're talking about Aristotle?"
Because she draws on Aristotle to make

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the argument about the present and
deploys Aristotle's own vocabulary to

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talk about artificial intelligence.

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And I'll tell you the
context that she puts it in.

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00:19:24,110 --> 00:19:27,790
Dr. Vallor is a contemporary
philosopher of technology, currently

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00:19:27,820 --> 00:19:31,260
the Gifford Chair in the Ethics of
Data and Artificial Intelligence

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00:19:31,260 --> 00:19:32,730
at the University of Edinburgh.

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00:19:33,974 --> 00:19:37,184
Her argument with Aristotle is
not, it's not a passing reference.

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00:19:37,714 --> 00:19:41,334
In her two thousand sixteen book,
Technology and the Virtues, she gives

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00:19:41,334 --> 00:19:46,514
her own detailed account of Aristotelian
ethics, eudaimonia, which we've talked

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00:19:46,524 --> 00:19:50,984
about in previous episodes as the
highest human good achieved through

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00:19:50,984 --> 00:19:55,024
the exercise of our distinctive
capacities, unified by what she calls

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using Aristotle's own term, phronesis.

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So she references this term
in a contemporary context,

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drawing directly on Aristotle.

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00:20:06,824 --> 00:20:08,404
This is not a comparison that I'm making.

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Her fullest treatment of this topic
comes in a section of the book called

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Prudential Judgment, and there Professor
Vallas states plainly that prudential

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00:20:16,044 --> 00:20:22,184
judgment is the very core of phronesis,
which she categorizes as practical wisdom.

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So phronesis, practical wisdom.

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00:20:26,074 --> 00:20:28,234
She works through Aristotle's
own distinction between

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00:20:28,264 --> 00:20:29,924
cleverness and genuine wisdom.

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00:20:30,514 --> 00:20:35,374
A person who skillfully achieves a bad
end is, in Aristotelian terms, just

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00:20:35,374 --> 00:20:37,914
merely clever, but they're not wise.

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00:20:38,724 --> 00:20:42,654
So in essence, a person who achieves
a bad end is not acting on their

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00:20:42,654 --> 00:20:45,924
normal blueprinted impulses.

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00:20:47,164 --> 00:20:51,694
But real practical wisdom requires
judgment about worthwhile ends,

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not just a skill at reaching
whatever end is in front of you.

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00:20:55,554 --> 00:20:59,224
And that judgment can't be reduced
to a formula because it has to fit

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a particular situation that will
never repeat in exactly the same way.

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00:21:03,604 --> 00:21:05,064
So this is going back.

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00:21:05,184 --> 00:21:06,354
This is not a skill.

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00:21:06,454 --> 00:21:10,344
She's also making this argument, but
she's gonna tie this to the contemporary

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00:21:10,344 --> 00:21:16,002
situation as follows And by the way, she's
in correct-- she's in direct agreement

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00:21:16,042 --> 00:21:17,822
with Gadamer on this particular point.

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00:21:19,332 --> 00:21:23,922
But she carries the argument further
into her public testimony in, before

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00:21:23,922 --> 00:21:26,832
the US Congress, which was in twenty
twenty-three, where she argues

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00:21:26,832 --> 00:21:32,092
directly that the concept of phronesis,
this practical wisdom within the

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context of AI has become antiquated.

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It's not a skill.

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00:21:36,862 --> 00:21:39,572
It's ignored, and her claim is precise.

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00:21:40,292 --> 00:21:43,992
This is not a side effect of AI systems
lacking judgment, so she's not blaming

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00:21:43,992 --> 00:21:48,532
it on the system, but she's saying that
it's an argument about a current political

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00:21:48,532 --> 00:21:50,592
narrative performing a troubling function.

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00:21:51,572 --> 00:21:55,982
And that narrative is convincing
people that judgment itself no

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longer matters because a machine
supposedly will do it better.

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00:22:00,502 --> 00:22:02,452
Let me just take a break
here for one second here.

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So this is the absolute essence.

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00:22:04,672 --> 00:22:06,202
She's not blaming it on the technology.

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00:22:06,202 --> 00:22:08,912
She claims by her own words
she's not anti-technology.

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00:22:09,122 --> 00:22:11,392
But what she's saying is that
the people who are promoting

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00:22:11,402 --> 00:22:15,312
the technology are saying that
your judgment is not necessary.

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00:22:16,002 --> 00:22:20,942
That judgment that she's drawing upon from
Aristotle, this phronesis, this practical

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00:22:20,942 --> 00:22:26,742
wisdom, she is making the claim that the
people pushing AI are not valuing that.

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00:22:26,902 --> 00:22:29,552
As a matter of fact, they're going
a step further and saying that the

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00:22:29,552 --> 00:22:31,742
computers and AI will do it better.

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00:22:33,132 --> 00:22:36,102
So there are two further
threads that support this claim.

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First, Dr. Valla consistently scopes
her concern to AI technologies that

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00:22:40,952 --> 00:22:44,962
affects what she calls basic liberties
and opportunities to flourish.

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00:22:44,962 --> 00:22:51,472
So she echoes the same question that
Dr. Foot spent in her career insisting

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00:22:51,992 --> 00:22:55,272
that has a factual answer, though
Valla does not build an explicit

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00:22:55,272 --> 00:22:56,632
argument on Foot's terms herself.

355
00:22:56,632 --> 00:23:03,244
So Dr. Valla is not referencing Foot
In a later book, Dr. Vallor called

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The AI Mirror, which she wrote in
twenty twenty-four, Dr. Vallor opens

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00:23:07,254 --> 00:23:11,204
with the story of Blake Lemoine,
the Google engineer who claimed in

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00:23:11,204 --> 00:23:15,014
twenty twenty-two that the company's
AI system had become conscious.

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00:23:16,094 --> 00:23:19,624
So expert dismissed this claim,
but Vallor treats the episode of a

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symptom rather than the aberration.

361
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So this is, this is particularly
interesting as well.

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So her analogy is that AI systems
trained on recorded human behavior,

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they function as a mirror.

364
00:23:32,744 --> 00:23:37,604
There's no judgment involved, and in her
account, it's a distorted mirror at that.

365
00:23:38,254 --> 00:23:45,424
In her own words, such systems, quote,
"Extract, amplify, and push forward

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whatever patterns already dominate their
training data, manufacturing something

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00:23:51,174 --> 00:23:54,844
that looks like an insight, it appears
to the user as an insight, but it's

368
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actually just a repetition at scale."

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So in e-essence, she's
comparing this to a skill.

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00:24:01,004 --> 00:24:05,794
She's not comparing this to judgment at
all, yet it is being presented as wisdom.

371
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So this is part of her,
her big concern here.

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And going back to her previous
work from two thousand and sixteen,

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Technology and Virtues, Vallor
named the stakes quite plainly.

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00:24:17,734 --> 00:24:21,284
She said the danger was never
super intelligence itself, but a

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00:24:21,284 --> 00:24:25,224
widening cultural gap between the
scope of our global techno, what she

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00:24:25,224 --> 00:24:29,484
calls techno-social power and the
depth of our techno-moral wisdom.

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00:24:31,334 --> 00:24:36,034
And then eight years and two further books
later and Senate, and, as she spoke to her

378
00:24:36,064 --> 00:24:40,854
Senate testimony, that gap is the argument
this whole episode has been circling

379
00:24:40,854 --> 00:24:45,444
from a different direction, but arrived
at independently by someone who read

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00:24:45,454 --> 00:24:52,344
the same philosopher that Gadamer read
and Foot read, and McIntyre, and drawing

381
00:24:52,344 --> 00:24:56,954
on the same concept of phronesis, but
used in a completely different context.

382
00:24:58,084 --> 00:25:00,814
Now, one further connection is
worth pointing to, and this is

383
00:25:00,814 --> 00:25:02,914
not hers, but this is my own.

384
00:25:03,564 --> 00:25:08,274
Popper's fear, as discussed early in
this episode, was of purpose or telos

385
00:25:08,604 --> 00:25:13,044
scaled up to a societal level beyond
the individual to an entire nation.

386
00:25:14,404 --> 00:25:17,304
Vallor doesn't make that
comparison herself, but consider

387
00:25:17,304 --> 00:25:20,664
the following, meaning that she
doesn't draw on Popper specifically

388
00:25:22,848 --> 00:25:24,788
A techno-- in this case,
we're gonna discuss AI.

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00:25:25,508 --> 00:25:29,818
A technology capable of shaping how
billions of people think, decide,

390
00:25:29,868 --> 00:25:37,368
and act, as characterized by Vallor,
is arguably more total in its reach

391
00:25:37,628 --> 00:25:41,988
than even the nation-state destiny
that Popper was concerned about.

392
00:25:42,608 --> 00:25:46,308
So in other words, , this telos
scaling to a, a national level,

393
00:25:46,548 --> 00:25:50,048
while Vallor is saying, "No, this
is gonna be even bigger than that."

394
00:25:52,182 --> 00:25:56,542
And this she would have, even though
she did not reference it by name she

395
00:25:56,542 --> 00:25:57,812
basically is making the connection.

396
00:25:57,822 --> 00:26:03,392
She sees the troubles in that, and this
is worthy, I believe, of, of consideration

397
00:26:06,420 --> 00:26:09,490
So where does this leave the
five of these theorists and the

398
00:26:09,490 --> 00:26:11,960
question they've all been circling
from a different perspective?

399
00:26:12,780 --> 00:26:15,460
I just wanna briefly recap
what was discussed today.

400
00:26:17,000 --> 00:26:21,200
So we had Popper, and he worried that
a fixed idea of human purpose becomes

401
00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:26,370
dangerous once it is scaled up to the
societal level and once it is imposed

402
00:26:26,430 --> 00:26:29,260
on people from above, not from within.

403
00:26:31,070 --> 00:26:36,910
MacIntyre he thinks Aristotle's actual
claim never gets that big, that Popper

404
00:26:36,910 --> 00:26:38,910
is overblowing this claim to begin with.

405
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:42,710
And therefore, it doesn't need the
assumption that Popper was most concerned

406
00:26:42,720 --> 00:26:46,320
about in the first place because it's
based on the individual, not society.

407
00:26:48,190 --> 00:26:51,080
Now, Gadamer thinks that
the real safeguard, that's

408
00:26:51,080 --> 00:26:52,300
not even an argument at all.

409
00:26:52,970 --> 00:26:56,620
It's that purpose, properly
understood, works through judgment,

410
00:26:56,780 --> 00:26:59,080
phronesis, exercised in the moment.

411
00:26:59,630 --> 00:27:03,200
So it's not a rule that can be written
down and handed to everyone in the same

412
00:27:03,210 --> 00:27:07,880
way, which is what he implies would
be a function of a, a government or

413
00:27:07,880 --> 00:27:10,270
a societal force coming from the top.

414
00:27:12,180 --> 00:27:16,140
Dr. Foot thinks the whole question
has a factual answer, the same

415
00:27:16,140 --> 00:27:19,580
way in her reference to a wolf
that she did in her example.

416
00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:25,400
So she s- doesn't see this even as a
question because she sees this good as

417
00:27:25,400 --> 00:27:29,240
something that is just based on what
people are, what's in that blueprint.

418
00:27:31,060 --> 00:27:34,880
And lastly, as we talked about before,
Professor Valla thinks the stakes

419
00:27:34,880 --> 00:27:40,270
of getting this wrong have gone up
considerably with AI because now we

420
00:27:40,270 --> 00:27:43,620
are building systems powerful enough
to shape how billions of people think

421
00:27:44,700 --> 00:27:48,800
and without ever pausing to ask what
those systems are being actually for.

422
00:27:50,320 --> 00:27:53,130
Now, this episode doesn't advocate
for one position over another.

423
00:27:54,000 --> 00:27:57,770
I can only offer the perspectives of
five serious thinkers looking at the

424
00:27:57,770 --> 00:28:02,140
same question at the same source,
but from five different perspectives

425
00:28:02,420 --> 00:28:04,290
and all landing in different spots.

426
00:28:05,110 --> 00:28:06,490
That's not a failure of the argument.

427
00:28:06,490 --> 00:28:10,420
That is generally what I believe,
takes an open question, looks

428
00:28:10,420 --> 00:28:11,890
at it, and takes it seriously.

429
00:28:13,250 --> 00:28:17,270
It is also worth mentioning why
this particular shape fits in this

430
00:28:17,310 --> 00:28:19,720
particular episode about Aristotle

431
00:28:22,298 --> 00:28:27,068
Aristotle's question about human purpose
is old enough and central enough that

432
00:28:27,068 --> 00:28:30,928
five serious thinkers can each take
a real run at it without any of them

433
00:28:30,928 --> 00:28:35,038
being simply dismissed out of hand
as being wrong or incorrect by their

434
00:28:35,038 --> 00:28:36,918
supporters or their detractors alike.

435
00:28:37,878 --> 00:28:43,268
If nothing else, this speaks to the
enduring and conflicting understanding of

436
00:28:43,268 --> 00:28:50,818
the Aristotelian concept two-- over 2,000
years later and applies to the people

437
00:28:50,818 --> 00:28:52,668
that followed him following his work.

438
00:28:54,598 --> 00:28:57,878
Now, one thread stays open as we close
out and we come to the end of this

439
00:28:57,878 --> 00:29:02,028
episode, and this is something we're
gonna address in subsequent episodes.

440
00:29:03,358 --> 00:29:08,048
Much of what, and this is an important
coda to the end of our discussion about

441
00:29:08,048 --> 00:29:11,948
Aristotle, I believe, because much of
what Aristotle argues about a good human

442
00:29:11,948 --> 00:29:17,958
life assumes, in his time, a stable
community by which to grow up inside of.

443
00:29:18,588 --> 00:29:20,418
This is something that he called the polis

444
00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:26,680
But that assumption by many historical
accounts held for Aristotle's own

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00:29:26,680 --> 00:29:31,920
world, it didn't necessarily hold
very long after, after he was gone.

446
00:29:32,910 --> 00:29:36,400
So when Alexander's conquest, for
example, broke apart the Greek

447
00:29:36,400 --> 00:29:41,090
city-states, the polis, Aristotle's
picture of the good life lost the stable

448
00:29:41,090 --> 00:29:42,430
ground that it had been standing on.

449
00:29:43,240 --> 00:29:46,860
So thinkers who came directly after
him, and we're gonna discuss them

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00:29:46,860 --> 00:29:50,630
in later episodes, the Stoics and
the Epicureans, for example, they

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00:29:50,630 --> 00:29:52,210
were responding to the collapse.

452
00:29:52,390 --> 00:29:56,000
So they weren't responding necessarily
to Aristotle, they were corresponding

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00:29:56,000 --> 00:30:00,470
to the lack of this city-state
polis existence . And that's where

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00:30:00,470 --> 00:30:01,890
I'm gonna take this series next

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00:30:04,116 --> 00:30:09,086
The sources for this two-part are
the Nicomachean Ethics MacIntyre's

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00:30:09,126 --> 00:30:14,066
Own Virtue, Philippa Foot's Natural
Goodness, and Popper's Own Society,

457
00:30:14,066 --> 00:30:16,206
and Shannon Vallow's The AI Mirror.

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00:30:16,356 --> 00:30:17,506
They're all in the show notes.

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00:30:17,886 --> 00:30:20,776
Thanks for listening and looking
forward to chatting with you soon

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00:30:25,151 --> 00:30:28,171
If you enjoyed this episode, you
can find "Notions of Progress" on

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00:30:28,171 --> 00:30:30,741
YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify.

462
00:30:31,011 --> 00:30:34,301
And all the sources, reading
recommendations, and further context

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00:30:34,311 --> 00:30:36,261
for every episode are in the show notes.

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00:30:36,801 --> 00:30:40,871
If you are enjoying this series, liking
the episode on YouTube and signing up for

465
00:30:40,881 --> 00:30:46,091
the newsletter at notionsofprogress.com
really helps more people find these ideas.

466
00:30:46,661 --> 00:30:51,181
For those who wanna go even deeper,
the Curator's Frame blog and Substack

467
00:30:51,211 --> 00:30:55,061
newsletter accompany each episode with
the questions the scholarship leaves open.

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00:30:55,741 --> 00:30:58,991
I'm Marshall, tracing ideas
of progress from antiquity to

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00:30:58,991 --> 00:31:02,841
the age of AI and leaving the
debates open for you to consider.

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00:31:03,111 --> 00:31:04,021
Until next time